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Economics & The Land Ethic
Beauty Beyond Time
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Natural Law,
Economics and the Common Good

Joseph Milne

According to Natural Law everything has a proper end in harmony with nature as a whole. In a society this means that wealth has a proper end in serving the common good. This talk will explore the implications of this principle in relation to the concepts of ‘property’ and ‘right use’.

My theme is natural law, economics and the common good, and I would like to begin with a definition of natural law: The natural law is the harmonious ordering of Nature to its proper end, which is justice and the good. It is the inherent moral order of the universe. I draw this definition from the long tradition of natural law which can be traced back to ancient Egypt, through Greek Presocratic philosophy, through Plato and Aristotle, through Roman law and through medieval theology up to the fifteenth century. Throughout that long history there was an understanding that the universe was ordered to the good and in harmony with the whole. Justice and wisdom permeated Nature, ordering it from within. This was expressed in various ways. In ancient Egypt it was through the goddess Maat, who embodied truth, justice and wisdom. Maat is present everywhere. It is the unwritten law everyone knows they are called to follow if they are to live auspiciously and in friendship with Nature and the gods. Maat is very like the ancient Sanskrit Rta, the ordering principle of the universe. It is also like the ancient Chinese principle of the Dao. It is the unwritten law, the law before any codes of law.

The same meaning is found in the Greek word for law, nomos. Heraclitus speaks of this law in the Fragments where he says:

112. Wisdom is the foremost virtue, and wisdom consists in speaking the truth, and in lending an ear to nature and acting according to her.

113-14. Wisdom is common to all. . . . They who would speak with intelligence must hold fast to the [wisdom that is] common to all, as a city holds fast to its law, and even more strongly. For all human laws are fed by one divine law, which prevails as far as it listeth and suffices for all things and excels all things.[1]

Here the wisdom common to all is the wisdom pervading in the universe and common to human intelligence. It is the ‘divine law’ which guides all human laws. It provides for all things. It is providential, caring for things according to their place in nature. It is this divine law that is heard by ‘lending an ear to nature and acting according to her’. This law foresees all things and provides for all human wants.

In his Rhetoric Aristotle speaks of the ‘unwritten laws’ sanctioned by heaven:

The unwritten laws are the great fundamental conceptions of morality, derived and having their sanction from heaven, antecedent and superior to all the conventional enactments of human societies, and common alike to all mankind. [2]

In more mythic terms, it is the law of the Greek god Cronus, the law of the Age of Gold that Hesiod records in his Works and Days. In that Age Nature gave to all freely. It is an Age free from avarice, the vice in Greek philosophy that corrupts society. Avarice forgets the law and becomes the mark of the Age of Iron, where few hold to their word.

In Plato’s Laws the Age of Gold is symbolised by the golden cord in the soul, where the Athenian Stranger says “this cord is the golden and sacred pull of calculation, and is called the common law of the city” [3] The word ‘calculation’ is a translation of the Greek logismos which more accurately in this context means ‘right judgement’. The ‘common law of the city’ is the universal unwritten law shared by all humanity. It is known directly by the intellect in the soul that is open to the guidance of the gods or divine reason.

Two ideas are transmitted and developed from Plato’s understanding of a knowledge of this ‘common law’ within the soul. First, that every being has an innate knowledge of the law that guides its mode of life within the greater order of nature. Hence the idea that all should act in accord with nature. Second, that human reason is informed by eternal principles that guide action towards the true and the good.

Aristotle divides the intellect into two aspects which he calls the ‘theoretical reason’ and the ‘practical reason’. The theoretical reason discerns eternal principles of truth, such as in the law of non-contradiction where, for example, something cannot exist and not exist. The practical reason, on the other hand, has an inherent knowledge of the good from which it makes practical ethical judgements. While the theoretical reason is concerned with eternal truths and is contemplative, the practical reason is concerned with contingent actions and decisions in the moment. The practical reason is the ground of ethical knowledge. It has a capacity to foresee the consequences of actions. It is the knowledge that one should always act justly and never unjustly. But since it has a capacity of foresight, the practical reason also knows that a good action is one that serves the common good. Right action is at once being true to oneself and acting according to nature. We recall what Heraclitus said:

...wisdom consists in speaking the truth, and in lending an ear to nature and acting according to her.

In a highly compressed way he is saying the same as Aristotle says of the two aspects of reason, the theoretical and the practical.

In a variety of different ways, these essential ideas passed through the early Stoic philosophers and through Cicero and then into medieval theology. Law was considered in three aspects: the eternal law in the mind of God, the universal law shared by all mankind, and the positive or human law that each society codifies for itself. The universal law is also called the common law or the natural law. The codified law should be in accord with the universal law, otherwise it cannot be called law.

How might all this apply to the study of economics? Well, since it apples to everything it necessarily must apply to economics. I began with a short definition of natural law:

The natural law is the harmonious ordering of Nature to its proper end, which is justice and the good.

Apart from the ethical aspect, the important aspect here is the understanding that everything has a proper end. This refers to what is called the telos of things, which is their purpose within nature. This law governs the development and growth of things and their function as part of nature as a whole. This is readily observable in living things. They grow according to their nature into maturity. According to this understanding, the nature of a growing thing is known only when it is fully formed or mature. Aristotle was the first to elaborate this view of nature, although it is present in Plato. Thus Aristotle says we can discern human nature properly only in the mature adult. He goes further, saying that the truly mature adult is a virtuous adult. This is because only the virtuous person has fulfilled their telos, or come to completion. The telos of things is also called their final cause, the end for which they come into being. The same is said in a different way by Plato. For Plato the telos and the ethical converge. Hence the great emphasis in Greek education on the cultivation of the virtues. Without the virtues of prudence, justice, courage and temperance a person cannot be fully rational. I think everyone understands this to some degree. Virtues are not moral principles but capacities, or what the Greeks called ‘habits’ or ‘skills’. They involve self-mastery. That is the Greek idea of the mature person. The virtuous person can live by the natural law whether or not it is reflected in the positive laws of a society.

If everything has a proper end in the order of nature, we may ask about the proper end of the economy. The first thing that the natural law indicates is that wealth must have a proper end, and this end must lie beyond itself. Plato ranks wealth as necessary for the health of the body, and the health of the body as necessary for the sake of the soul. The aim or purpose of society is the cultivation of the soul. But if wealth becomes an end in itself, then it distorts the natural order of the society. In the Laws the Athenian Stranger says:

The noblest and best thing of all for every city is that the truth be told about wealth, namely, that it is for the sake of the body, and the body is for the sake of the soul. Since, therefore, there are goods for the sake of which wealth by nature exists, it would come third after virtue of the body and of the soul. [4]

The pursuit of wealth as an end in itself is to miss its proper purpose.

Thomas Aquinas has much to say about this. The aim of life for the individual ought to correspond with the aim of society as a whole. There is therefore a correspondent ranking of goods for the individual and for society. For example, he says in his treatise On the Governance of Rulers:

Now the same judgement is to be formed about the end of society as a whole as about the end of one man. If, therefore, the ultimate end of man were some good that existed in himself, then the ultimate end of the multitude to be governed would likewise be for the multitude to acquire such good, and persevere in its possession. If such an ultimate end either of an individual man or a multitude were a corporeal one, namely, life and health of body, to govern would then be a physician’s charge. If that ultimate end were an abundance of wealth, then knowledge of economics would have the last word in the community’s government. If the good of the knowledge of truth were of such a kind that the multitude might attain to it, the king would have to be a teacher. [5]

For Aquinas the final good to be aimed at is beatitude, or mystical union with God. So both man and society have an aim beyond themselves. Nevertheless, there is an order that belongs to each individual and to society which belongs to the social and political life. The spiritual life cannot be fulfilled without properly ordering society. And the principle of the proper ordering of society is the common good. The individual good cannot be secured without aiming at the common good. Thus Aquinas says: “Man cannot possibly be good unless he stands in the right relation to the common good”. [6]

Without wealth the body will not be healthy, and without a healthy body the soul will not flourish. This is the same for the individual and for society. The natural law serves the good of each through serving the good of the whole. If every individual strives only for their own good, it will not be attained without harming the common good. The inner life and the outer life cannot be separated.

This established a principle that was lost in the seventeenth century debates about law and society: namely the principle that man is by nature a social and political being. Aquinas summarises this traditional understanding rather beautifully in the following way:

It is, however, clear that the end of a multitude gathered together is to live virtuously. For men form a group for the purpose of living well together, a thing which the individual man living alone could not attain, and good life is virtuous life. Therefore, virtuous life is the end for which men gather together. The evidence for this lies in the fact that only those who render mutual assistance to one another in living well form a genuine part of an assembled multitude. If men assembled merely to live, then animals and slaves would form a part of the civil community. Or, if men assembled only to accrue wealth, then all those who traded together would belong to one city. Yet we see that only such are regarded as forming one multitude as are directed by the same laws and the same government to live well. [7]

The expression to live well comes straight from Aristotle. To live well is the final end society aims at. And living well is possible only in community, and good community is possible only with good laws and virtuous citizens. Man is at once the political being and the ethical being.

There are two obvious ways in which we can see that political community is natural to man. The first is that the human species has language and speech. In the Timaeus Plato says speech was given to man by the gods in order that he may speak the truth of things. It is part of the human calling to bear witness to truth. Aristotle says man is the only species with speech so that there can be discourse on justice and injustice. Such discourse belongs to man as the social and political being. The second way in which it can be seen that political community is natural to man is that each individual has particular talents through which they may make a unique contribution to the community. There is a natural division of talents ordained by nature for the ends they serve. The corollary to this is that no individual is sufficient unto himself. What one lacks, another provides. Hence mutual exchange is natural to the human species, grounded first in speech, then in tradition or custom, then in economics. But the natural principle of exchange is generosity, giving birth to justice. In this most essential sense, ordained by nature, the most perfect expression of society is friendship. In considering the ends that the lawgiver should seek, Plato says in the Laws:

One should reason as follows: when we asserted one should look toward moderation, or toward prudence, or friendship, these goals are not different but the same. Even if many other words of this sort crop up, let’s not let it disturb us.[8]

But true friendship is through the practice of the virtues, and in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle makes clear that only the virtuous may become friends in the true sense. This is because true friendship is beyond pleasure or utility. It is the love of virtue in the soul of the friend. Between friends all things are held in common.

This is the first principle of property. Nature gives freely to all and in right proportion, and in friendship founded in virtue there is no need for property laws. This is the highest ideal. Yet the philosophers and lawmakers have always understood that this highest ideal has to be moderated according to the quality of virtue in a society. For Plato a society of wholly virtuous citizens would be a city of ‘sons of gods’. Hesiod had seen it as the Age of Gold. Aquinas saw such a society as Eden before the Fall.

So, where there is not perfect virtue and perfect friendship, there must be human or positive laws regarding property. Aquinas says this is because if all things were held in common they would not be duly cared for. Fallen man cares for what is his own. Therefore laws need to be made for the most equitable division of property, especially land and the gifts of nature, where their right use would continue to serve the common good. Thus it is established that all property laws are a modification of the natural law, yet which seeks to attain the same end as the natural law, which is common benefit. We might say that property law is the birth of positive law. In primitive societies, customs dealt with the question of property without the need of codes of law. Even today the Maori people in New Zealand see themselves as belonging to the land, rather than as owning land. And that would seem the right way round. But in societies greater than the village or town, it would seem that codes of law are required.

For Aquinas the purpose of ownership of property is to establish its right use. There is no inherent ‘right to property’ in the modern sense, not even through one’s labour. Labour does not create or establish ownership. The natural law works on the basis of duties rather than entitlements. The right use of things, especially the land which is given by nature, is to serve the common good. Land has a right use, and this right use is clearly absent if it is put to a use that deprives any individual or society at large of its benefit. That is simply theft.

I appreciate that we all understand the common use of the land. But there is an aspect which is often overlooked when thinking of land possession purely in terms of society. The wrong use of land harms the land itself. For example, we recognise the dreadful social conditions that arose with the dissolution of the monasteries and later with the enclosures. We also see the decline in social conditions during the industrial revolution, with the slum tenements in the cities. But it is easy to overlook that both the enclosures and the industrial revolution brought about abuse of the land itself, or even originate in the abuse of land. Modern mining and farming methods are an abuse of the land, just as were the building of the city slums. The land itself has a proper end, which is to nurture all living beings, including human society. The first duty of society according to natural law is the duty to preserve the land for the common good. This duty is prior to the law of rent, and the law of rent rests upon it.

If serving the common good is the right use of the land or of nature more widely, then according to natural law it is not theft if a destitute person takes from private possessions what they need. Aquinas says that in the case of dire need properly laws are suspended and common ownership is resumed.

But even in our private possessions, apart from land, ownership is qualified by the principle of right use. For example, ownership does not give a right to destroy one’s own property, as claimed by some. (Adam Smith, for example.) That would make ownership absolute, while in fact it is only according to positive law. And positive law cannot overrule the natural law. But the right use of ones possessions means they should be used for the common good, not merely for oneself. Even eating a meal can be done for the common good. The right use of wealth is for the body so that the body may serve the soul, and the soul may serve the highest good. Used in this manner all things may serve the good of society and preserve nature and the land. To use things solely for oneself is theft. All things have a right use. For example, using money for gambling is a misuse of money and contrary to the nature of money. That is not a use it is intended for. And the modern gambling industry is both an abuse of money and of work. Any work that does not bring about a common benefit is not real work.

This brings us to perhaps one of the hardest questions of all for economic enquiry: What is the true purpose of work? We have become so accustomed to thinking of work as labour for production, and production for profit, that the real meaning of human work has become obscured. That manner of thinking dehumanises the economic realm and separates it from the social realm. It is what Karl Polanyi calls the ‘disembedding of the economy’ from the social realm. And so we have come to regard social justice and economic justice as two different things while in fact they are interdependent. At their heart lies the question of the true meaning and purpose of work.

Is there a model that can illustrate the true meaning of human work? This question is so obscured by the land question that we need to step outside that for a model. When discussing how, according to the natural law, all things are held in common, Aquinas remarks that this is perhaps possible only in the monastic life. The monk has no possessions because his work can be dedicated to the spiritual life and the welfare of society. Labouring in the fields can be a form of prayer. That is to say, work may be transformed through being dedicated to God. Work transformed in this way becomes a benefit to society as a whole.

I am not suggesting we should join a monastery! But the question of the dedication of work illuminates work itself at the deepest level. Earlier we saw how the natural law distributes the different human talents for the common good. What one lacks, another provides. This, I suggested, is the real root of economic exchange. It means that every exchange both fulfils a vocational calling and is mutually beneficial. That is the true spirit of work. Those fortunate in finding and following their natural vocations are fulfilled in their work and do not grudge putting all their effort into it. The question of dedication lies at the heart of the question of economic justice. What a society is dedicated to reveals its nature. Any economic exchange that is not equally beneficial to either party is an unjust exchange and a distortion of the true nature of exchange. It harms society as a whole. Most injustices in the modern economy are due to unequal exchanges, whether in employment, selling, or any use of land.

Unjust exchanges are also abuses of work. If dedicated to justice and the common good, then work would find its right use and nothing in nature would be abused or spoiled. Here the questions of economic justice and the environment converge. They are not really separate questions. That is why I noted earlier that the question of property in land is bound up with the right use of land. Property rights obscure the question of right use. Modern environmentalism seeks to find a compromise between preservation and exploitation. It is assumed that there is a necessary conflict between human wants and the provision of nature. This false notion is present in classical economics built on the notion of scarcity. But any human wants that involve the abuse of nature are false wants. This situation arises, as Plato says, when the pursuit of wealth takes precedence over health and the cultivation of the soul. There cannot be economic justice when the acquisition of wealth becomes the principle aim of a society. This aim necessarily leads to wealth inequality because one person’s excess is another’s loss, as Aristotle observes. Wealth equality is possible if proportioned with the natural providence of nature, where real equality is according to need. The idea that there is a competition for scarce recourses is a false and pernicious idea. We recall what Heraclitus said: “For all human laws are fed by one divine law, which prevails as far as it listeth and suffices for all things and excels all things”.

Let me close with a simple observation. From the perspective of natural law it is the highest ends of things that orders nature and which indicates the just order of society. Modern thinking supposes we must build from the bottom up, but the natural law says we should build from the top down. In philosophical language this means seeing the telos or ‘final causes’ of things, the true ends for which they come into being. Everything in nature has a final end which means its completion of itself in harmony with nature as a whole. Every living being desires the fulness of being. But to attain this it must live in accordance with nature. Man is liable to seek the fulness of being in wrong ends. Yet knowledge of the natural law is implanted in the practical reason and everyone knows that justice and the common good are the ends that should guide desire and also inform the positive laws of a society. Law in this sense should be a reminder of what we already know. It is not an external imposition laid upon us. It is that to which we are naturally inclined.

[1] Charles M. Bakewell, Source Book in Ancient Philosophy (Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1907) p. 34

[2] Aristotle On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse translated by George A. Kennedy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 1368bf.

[3] Plato, The Laws of Plato, translated by Thomas Pangle (Basic Books, New York, 1980) 644d-645a

[4] Plato, Laws 870b

[5] Thomas Aquinas, De Regno translated by Gerald B. Phelan (Toronto: The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949) 1.15. 106

[6] Josef Pieper, The Human Wisdom of St. Thomas: A Breviary of Philosophy from the Works of St Thomas Aquinas, quotation 335.

[7] Thomas Aquinas, De Regno translated by Gerald B. Phelan (Toronto: The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949) 1.15. 106

[8] Plato, The Laws of Plato, translated by Thomas Pangle (New York: Basic Books, 1980) 693b-693c.

This talk was given to the SPES Symposium "Spirit in Economics and Law" 2024

 

 

 

"Moral acts and human acts are one and the same thing." (Thomas Aquinas, ST 1a2ae, q. 1, a. 3, c.)

Aristotle Garden 2024